

3 JUNE 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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1 OF 1


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda



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3 JUNE 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 22)

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FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

Souphanouvong Warmly Greeted on Hanoi "Friendship" Visit 1
NLHS Proposal Hailed During Visit and in DRV, PRG Statements . . 4
DRV "Annuls" Procedures for 4 June Reception of Prisoners . . . 5
Communists Claim Major ARVN Defeat at Cambodian Town of Snuol . . 6
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Scores Strikes at North, DMZ . . . 8
DRV National Assembly Session Upcoming; Youth Meetings Held . . . 8

MIDDLE EAST

Podgorny Visit, Treaty Start "New Era" in UAR-USSR Relations . 11
Treaty: Regular Consultations, Military Cooperation Provided . 12
Communique Stresses Nasir Policies, Plays Down Party Ties . . . 14
Moscow Complains of U.S. Mediation in Mideast Conflict 16

CUBAN FISHING BOATS

Havana Accuses U.S. of Illegal Provocation, Aggression 18

FORCES IN EUROPE

Moscow Says U.S. Pressures NATO Allies on Brezhnev Proposal . . 21

USSR AND ROMANIA

Moscow Evinces Displeasure Over Ceausescu Visit to PRC 23

CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS

Intervention Issue Continues to Rankle Behind the Scenes 26
Congress Deepens Purge of Dubcek-Oriented Liberals 29

FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CPCZ Congress Reiterates Position on Munich Agreement 31

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Shakeup of Ukrainian Writers Union at May Congress 34

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

CONTENTS (Continued)

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Kang Sheng Reappears as Mao Greets Romanian Delegation	39
New Provincial Party Committee Announced for Tientsin	39

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FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 MAY 1971

Moscow (2862 items)

Czechoslovak CP Congress (0.1%)	21%
& Brezhnev Visit	
Podgornyy in UAR, (--)	13%
USSR-UAR Treaty	
Soviet June Elections (2%)	5%
African Liberation Day (0.2%)	4%
Launching of Mars II (4%)	3%
& III	
China (2%)	3%
Indochina (8%)	3%
Middle East (3%)	2%

Peking (1635 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	33%
Indochina	(41%)	28%
[1st Anniversary	(27%)	15%]
of Mao Statement		
[Sihanouk Tours	(1%)	3%]
PRC		
PRC-Austrian Diplomatic	(--)	7%
Relations		
Italian Economic	(4%)	3%
Delegation in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Hanoi propaganda is highlighted by publicity for Souphanouvong's 24-30 May "friendly visit" to North Vietnam as head of a "Lao people's delegation." Propaganda on the surprise visit highlights growing Indochinese solidarity in the year since the summit meeting and the "blows" dealt Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine by such "strategic victories" as those on the Highway 9-southern Laos front. Reiteration of DRV endorsement of the 12 May NLHS "peace initiative," calling for a U.S. bombing halt followed by a cease-fire, appears in propaganda on the visit as well as in the usual DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements--on 27 and 28 May--marking the seventh anniversary of the U.S. bombing of Laos.

The joint statement on Souphanouvong's visit scores the Administration in standard fashion, claiming that although U.S. defeat is evident "the bellicose Nixon Administration is stubbornly contemplating new military ventures against Indochina." The President's 1 June press conference also prompts the predictable criticism--in a Hanoi domestic service broadcast on the 3d--that he again "refused" to set a deadline for a total U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Hanoi's first comment on the planned GVN release of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners since 13 May, when VNA stipulated procedures for their transfer to a DRV ship on 4 June, comes in an authorized VNA statement on the 3d. VNA now says that in view of Saigon and U.S. announcements that only 13 of the promised 570 "patriots" would be returned, "the procedures stipulated for their reception are considered annulled."

Vietnamese and Cambodian communist media claim that ARVN forces were badly trounced as they withdrew from the Cambodian town of Snuol on 30 May, and comment holds that the battle has impaired allied defense lines and Vietnamization. Attention to scattered action in South Vietnam includes a 3 June NHAN DAN report which claims that an attack on an ARVN regimental headquarters west of Hue on 31 May struck a blow at the forward defense tactics used in the "doomed" Operation Lam Son 720--the allied operation launched in mid-April in the A Shau valley.

SOUPHANOUVONG WARMLY GREETED ON HANOI "FRIENDSHIP" VISIT

Communist media gave no hint of Souphanouvong's 24-30 May visit to Hanoi until after he had left. The first monitored report

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1971

- 2 -

of the visit was a Pachet Lao radio broadcast at 0345 GMT on 30 May which reported that the delegation had left Sam Neua for Hanoi on the 23d. The first report monitored from Hanoi media was a "communique" from the DRV Foreign Ministry, broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service at 0430 GMT on the 30th. Without mentioning any dates, it said that the Lao delegation "has paid a friendly visit" to the DRV.* Hanoi's acknowledgment that the delegation had arrived on the 24th came in VNA's description of the welcoming ceremony--transmitted approximately an hour after the initial announcement.

VNA said that a DRV delegation including Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh went to the border to meet the "long-awaited" visitors on the morning of their arrival and that the other members of the Politburo greeted them at an arrival ceremony in Hanoi.** The warmth of the welcome was pointed up by VNA's report that children presented flowers to "'Uncle' Souphanouvong," a title normally reserved for Ho Chi Minh and President Ton Duc Thang. Setting the tone on Indochinese solidarity, VNA quoted one of the elders who made up a special welcoming committee as saying: "What a great joy! Sihanouk and other Cambodian envoys were here with us for the lunar new year, and now we have Prince Souphanouvong and other Lao brothers."

President Thang gave a brief speech at the welcoming ceremony, and Souphanouvong replied. Subsequent activities included a banquet that evening, addressed by both leaders, and a Hanoi "grand meeting" on the 25th addressed by Pham Van Dong and Souphanouvong. They also spoke at a banquet on the 29th; Thang and Souphanouvong addressed a 30 May departure ceremony. Other propaganda included greetings messages to the visitors from PRG leaders Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat and from Vietnam Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao. NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN both carried editorial comment.

* Souphanouvong's last publicly announced visit to Hanoi was for Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969. The last known previous Hanoi reference to his presence in Hanoi was a report of his stopover in April 1965 en route home from Djakarta, where he attended celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference.

** Le Thanh Nghi was absent, attending the Czechoslovak party congress.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 3 -

Hanoi said talks were held on 25 May between the Laotian group and Vietnamese leaders including Ton Duc Thang, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, as well as Vice Defense Minister Tran Sam and Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. According to VNA, the talks, on "the struggle of the Vietnamese and Lao people against the U.S. imperialist aggressors" and on "the militant solidarity and long-standing friendship" between the two peoples, were held in an atmosphere of "friendship and sincerity" and resulted in "complete identity of views." Hanoi media on 2 June carried the lengthy joint statement, signed on the 30th, which similarly says "the talks took place in an atmosphere of militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and total mutual confidence. The two parties reached complete unanimity of views on all questions raised."

The joint statement reviews at some length U.S. "aggression" and the "glorious victories" of the three peoples in their "coordinated fight." Propaganda surrounding the visit singles out the recent fighting in the Bolovens Plateau and Savannakhet areas of southern Laos as well as military successes in Cambodia. Particular attention is given to the "historic feat of strategic significance" on the Highway 9-southern Laos front.

MUTUAL SUPPORT, Ton Duc Thang and Pham Van Dong stressed
SOCIALIST AID Vietnamese determination to continue to
 "stand side by side" with the Lao and
Cambodian peoples in the spirit of Ho Chi Minh's last testament and pledged to fulfill their "internationalist duty" toward the Lao people. In this context Pham Van Dong on the 25th recalled that Ho had stressed the importance of "unity" in order to win victory. Souphanouvong thanked the DRV for fulfilling its "internationalist obligations," and at the rally on the 25th he explicitly thanked the Vietnamese for their "wholehearted and invaluable assistance" to the Lao resistance.* In the joint statement the two sides promised to continue to extend mutual support and assistance. The Lao side expresses appreciation for the "great, all-round, and disinterested assistance that the Vietnamese people, especially socialist North Vietnam, have always extended" to the Lao cause.

Pham Van Dong said that the Lao people's victories "are a credit" to the solidarity of the three Indochinese people

* For background on Laotian expressions of gratitude for Vietnamese assistance, see the TRENDS of 28 April 1971, pages 13-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 4 -

and to the support of the "socialist countries." Souphanouvong named the Soviet Union and China when thanking the socialist countries for their "valuable assistance," and both are named in the joint statement's expression of appreciation for "great and effective assistance." (TASS' brief summary of the statement does not name the countries in reporting that the two sides expressed gratitude for aid from the "socialist countries.")

Consistent with the DRV speakers' failure to refer explicitly to Soviet and Chinese assistance, Hanoi mentions neither the PRC nor the USSR in reporting that "members of the diplomatic corps" were present at the welcoming ceremony and in recounting other events during Souphanouvong's visit. NCNA noted that the PRC ambassador was among those present to greet the delegation, but brief TASS reports did not mention diplomatic attendance.

NLHS PROPOSAL HAILED DURING VISIT AND IN DRV, PRG STATEMENTS

Praise for the NLHS stand on a Laotian settlement and for the new 12 May peace initiative appears in some of the propaganda on the Souphanouvong visit, and the NLHS proposal is cited in the joint statement along with the peace proposals for South Vietnam and Sihanouk's program. At the Hanoi rally on the 25th, Pham Van Dong said that the Vietnamese people and DRV Government "warmly acclaim and fully support" the NLHS five-point political solution and 12 May peace initiative. He stated that the DRV, "as a signatory to the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos," demands that the United States respect the agreement and end interference and aggression in Laos, first of all ending the bombing of the whole territory of Laos so that the armed forces in Laos may effect a cease-fire and the parties concerned may discuss a coalition government. Stressing growing Pathet Lao influence and prestige, he said that the initiatives taken by the NLHS to end U.S. aggression, restore peace, and achieve "national concord" are getting increasing world support and that the Lao people's military, political, and diplomatic victories have enhanced the prestige and position of the NLHS and Patriotic Neutralist Forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 5 -

Souphanouvong at the rally expressed "regret" that Souvanna Phouma has not yet responded "positively and seriously" to the proposal for a U.S. bombing halt and a cease-fire. Rather, he said, Souvanna Phouma has "slandered" the NLHS and the DRV and is staging provocations against the DRV embassy in Vientiane while the Americans intensify the bombing of Laos and "instigate their lackeys" to mount new attacks on the liberated zone. (To date communist propaganda has not mentioned Souvanna Phouma's 26 May message to Souphanouvong in reply to the NLHS peace proposal, nor has it reported the message from Souphanouvong, delivered to Souvanna Phouma on the 27th by special envoy Tiao Souk Vongsak.)

The Vietnamese communists continue to publicize other authoritative support for the proposal. On 27 and 29 May Liberation media reported messages to Souphanouvong from Nguyen Huu Tho and Trinh Dinh Thao supporting the initiative. DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on the seventh anniversary of the U.S. bombing of Laos, publicized on 27 and 28 May respectively, also include expressions of support for the peace proposal. Continued Pathet Lao publicity for the 12 May initiative includes radio reports of rallies held in Sam Neua and Khammouane Province to denounce U.S. "aggression" over the past seven years since the start of the bombing of Laos and to acclaim the NLHS' "good will" in putting forward its new initiative.

Moscow, which previously supported the NLHS proposal in some routine-level comment, currently limits itself to TASS reports of the Vietnamese comment. Peking similarly reports Vietnamese comment, still avoiding comment on its own authority.

DRV "ANNULS" PROCEDURES FOR 4 JUNE RECEPTION OF PRISONERS

Consistent with the earlier failure to acknowledge that the question of release of sick and wounded prisoners had been broached at Paris, the Vietnamese communist accounts of the session on 27 May ignored the fact that GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam had agreed to the provisions outlined in the 13 May VNA statement for the transfer of 570 sick and wounded prisoners to DRV ships on 4 June.* The VNA account said

* See the TRENDS of 19 May, pages 1-4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 6 -

merely that the U.S. and Saigon "puppet" delegates continued "to dwell on the so-called 'prisoner of war' problem with a view to concealing the U.S. refusal to withdraw all its troops quickly from South Vietnam while prolonging its war of aggression." The account, of course, failed to acknowledge that Lam again called for a response to his government's additional offer to transfer 1,200 North Vietnamese prisoners held in captivity for four years or more to a neutral country for internment.

Hanoi media's first comment on the issue since the 13 May VNA statement appears in the authorized VNA statement on 3 June. It says that in view of the announcements on the 2d from Saigon and Washington that only 13 persons "whom they call North Vietnamese" would be released, the previously outlined stipulations for the 4 June reception "are considered annulled." It also says VNA will issue a statement on the 13 "mentioned by the puppets on 2 June."

In timing suggestive of lack of coordination, the first known Liberation Front propaganda treatment of the question of GVN release of sick and wounded prisoners came in a cease-fire order by the PLAF Command in northern Quang Tri, carried by VNA as well as LPA on 2 June. It said that "to insure safety for the Vietnamese patriots illegally detained by the U.S. puppets in South Vietnam, whom the latter had to agree to unconditionally release on 4 June," the command had ordered the forces in northern Quang Tri "to suspend military activities on land, sea, and air from 0000 to 2400 hours on 4 June, all within the cease-fire zone as defined in the 13 May statement by VNA." Liberation Radio broadcast the PLAF Command order on the morning of 3 June, some two hours before VNA released its statement annulling the procedures.

COMMUNISTS CLAIM MAJOR ARVN DEFEAT AT CAMBODIAN TOWN OF SNUOL

First details of the communists' capture of Snuol came in a 1 June report on the fighting from AKI, the news agency of Sihanouk's regime. AKI claimed that in three hours of fighting at Snuol on 30 May the Cambodian National People's Liberation Armed Forces (CNPLAF) "annihilated" the ARVN 8th Task Force and 1st Armored Regiment, killing or wounding 1,500 troops and capturing 300. The CNPLAF, according to AKI, took complete control of Snuol township and the rubber plantation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 7 -

there. AKI said that ARVN forces were compelled to flee Snuol after a four-day siege, that the retreating forces were intercepted and routed, and that South Vietnamese relief forces were turned back and also suffered "serious losses."

AKI also claimed that in the fighting at Snuol on the 30th the CNPLAF downed five aircraft, captured 50 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and destroyed nearly 150 military vehicles. According to the report, 500 weapons, including 10 large cannons, 500 tons of munitions, and nearly 100 radios, were seized and a large quantity of war materiel was destroyed.

Hanoi and Liberation radios both commented on the Snuol fighting in broadcasts on 1 June, with Hanoi observing that the allies lost more men and vehicles than in any previous Cambodian engagement. Liberation Radio called the "victory" at Snuol evidence of the "disastrous failure" of ARVN tactics in Cambodia, particularly their use of armored vehicles. The broadcast held that the Snuol battle was a further blow at Vietnamization and added that "Nixon's formula of 'U.S. fire-power plus puppet troops' has been further doomed."

Hanoi and Front radio commentaries on the 2d ridiculed statements by allied military spokesmen that the ARVN withdrawal from Snuol was in accordance with pre-set plans. Comparing the statements to allied explanations of the withdrawal from southern Laos earlier this year, the Front broadcast remarked: "Only the nearly 1,500 corpses of Saigon troops in the Snuol area and the numerous U.S. tanks destroyed there can faithfully reflect the true nature of the U.S. and Saigon military commanders' so-called 'withdrawal in accord with plans mapped out beforehand.'" The Hanoi broadcast also accused Saigon of releasing false figures on communist casualties in the battle.

The battle at Snuol was applauded in Hanoi's press on 2 June, with both an article in NHAN DAN and an editorial in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claiming that the engagement upset allied plans in Cambodia and disrupted the defense line northwest of Saigon. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial hailed the action as "an outstanding major annihilation battle and another telling blow at the U.S. 'Vietnamization policy.'" It claimed that the allied forces are declining throughout Indochina and that the Saigon army has "lost all hopes of recovering after the southern Laos disaster." The

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 8 -

Snuol victory, the editorial concluded, is a "hard rebuff to Nixon's claim that it would take months to fully appreciate all the real effects of the southern Laos drive."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES STRIKES AT NORTH, DMZ

Continuing the series of statements protesting U.S. actions against the North, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 29 May charged that from 22 to 27 May U.S. planes, including B-52's, "many times" bombed Huong Lap village and "ordered artillery based south of the DMZ to shell Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Son villages." The statement said the villages are located above the 17th parallel, in the northern part of the DMZ.

The spokesman also charged that from 22 to 24 May and on the 26th, U.S. planes bombed and strafed areas in Quang Binh Province.* He stated that the U.S. strikes caused "losses in lives and property," and he routinely condemned the "criminal acts of war" and demanded an end to all U.S. acts of encroachment on DRV sovereignty and security.

DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION UPCOMING; YOUTH MEETING HELD

A communique of the National Assembly Standing Committee carried by Hanoi radio on 27 May reports that the committee met that day under the chairmanship of Truong Chinh. According to the communique, the committee heard a report by a representative of the commission for the election of deputies to the National Assembly, Fourth Legislature, "on the situation and results of the election . . . and on the tasks of the commission." The communique adds that the committee "unanimously approved the activities of the commission and decided to present at the coming meeting of the National Assembly a report on the results of the election and documents and materials concerning the election." Other business included deciding "a number of questions concerning the convening of the first session" of the Fourth Legislature of the National Assembly.

* This presumably encompasses action in the DMZ on 23 May and the firing of a Shrike missile north of the DMZ on the 22d acknowledged by the U.S. command.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 9 -

Elections for the Fourth Legislature were belatedly held on 11 April.* The 1960 DRV Constitution provides that the National Assembly Standing Committee must convene the new National Assembly not later than two months after the elections.

YOUTH MEETING . Hanoi media reported on 30 May that Truong Chinh addressed a conference on the 29th which assessed the results of 10 years of achievements by the Vietnam Committee for Young Pioneers and Children and 10 years of implementing VWP Central Committee Instruction 197. The VNA account of the conference says that "as an expression of the party and state's constant care to children," Truong Chinh attended the meeting and addressed the conference. Hanoi radio on 1 June described the opening of a summer camp in Hanoi on the previous day for Hanoi teenagers and children to mark the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Ho Chi Minh Young Pioneers group and of the Ho Chi Minh children's group. The broadcast noted that President Ton Duc Thang, VWP First Secretary Le Duan, Politburo member Le Duc Tho, and alternate Politburo members Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung attended the opening. (The 40th anniversary of the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Group in March had prompted the appearance of Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Vice Premier Vo Nguyen Giap. Also on that occasion, Le Duan had a "cordial talk" with a group of youth union cadre representatives.)

In familiar fashion, Truong Chinh said that one generation cannot fulfill the tasks of liberating the South, defending the North, and building socialism and that the future is in the hands of the young. He recalled that Ho Chi Minh in his final testament had deemed the training and education of future revolutionary generations "of great importance and necessity." Truong Chinh had similarly cited Ho when he spoke at the 39th anniversary meeting of the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Group on 24 March 1970--a meeting which heralded the renaming of the Vietnam Working Youth Group after Ho.

* For a discussion of propaganda surrounding the announcement of National Assembly elections, see the TRENDS Supplement of 16 March 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 10 -

Emphasizing the importance of education, Chinh said that "propaganda organs, newspapers, publishing houses, and broadcasting stations must explain the objectives of education of teenagers and children to the people." He had made similar exhortations in January of last year when he addressed a correspondents' gathering of the weekly THIEU NIEN TIEN PHONG (Young Pioneers) on the occasion of its 15th anniversary.* At that time he went on to stress the importance of the papers educating the youth in ethics. At the current conference Chinh urged the "intensification of the educational role of families," which he singled out as "the weakest point at present." He warned that "we should not use our present difficulties as an excuse to pay only slight attention to the task of looking after and educating teenagers and children."

* See the TRENDS of 14 January 1970, pages 8-9.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 11 -

MIDDLE EAST

PODGORNY VISIT, TREATY START "NEW ERA" IN UAR-USSR RELATIONS

Moscow lauds the 15-year Soviet-UAR "friendship and cooperation treaty," signed on the 27th during the Podgorny delegation's 25-28 May "unofficial" visit to Cairo, as crowning past friendship and opening new horizons for wider cooperation. Propagandists widely quote Podgorny's statement in his banquet speech on the 27th that "from now on Soviet-UAR relations will rise to a higher level and enter a new qualitative era." Comment, including an IZVESTIYA editorial on the 30th, also echoes Podgorny in stressing that the treaty represents a blow to the plans of world imperialism which is trying to weaken UAR-Soviet relations.

Panelist Zavyalov, in the 30 May domestic service commentators' roundtable, scoffed at Western press speculation that the government "reshuffle" in the UAR represented "a sharp turn to the right" that would affect Soviet-Egyptian relations.* The "truly historic" treaty, he said, has given "inciters of discord from both East and West" a real lesson on their lack of political foresight. Zavyalov also pointed out that the treaty expressly prohibits interference in the internal affairs of each state. The IZVESTIYA editorial, broadcast in foreign languages including Arabic, heralds the importance of the treaty and defensively insists that in supporting the UAR the Soviet Union did not proceed from any short-term considerations and does not seek any selfish advantages and benefits for itself. Moscow's voluminous attention to Arab press comment on the treaty includes a TASS roundup on the 30th which cites the Cairo AL-AKHBAR as saying the document put an end to rumors that Soviet-Egyptian relations were deteriorating.

Moscow's domestic service, in a 2 June report on President Nixon's press conference the evening before, said only that in touching on the Soviet-UAR treaty the President "put the main emphasis on the American interpretation" of the balance of power in the Middle East. (The President said that should the treaty be followed by

* Moscow does not publicize an article by AKHBAR AL-YAWM chief editor al-Quddus, reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 29th, in which he said that Soviet-UAR friendship is not dependent on one or more persons and thus would not be affected if such individuals were ousted. He charged that "certain people" had tried to use their personal relations with Soviet authorities to create "centers of power" and assume internal control.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 12 -

the introduction of more weapons into the area, "it can only mean a new arms race and greatly jeopardize the chances for peace.") The Moscow report went on to reiterate the routine line that the U.S. Government, "under the pretext" of maintaining a balance of power, strives to insure military superiority for the "aggressor state," thus encouraging Israeli extremist circles to sabotage a peaceful political settlement.

TREATY: REGULAR CONSULTATIONS, MILITARY COOPERATION PROVIDED

The treaty of friendship and cooperation will be, when ratified, the only treaty the USSR has at present with a noncommunist, noncontiguous country.* The final article states that the treaty will come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, to take place in Moscow "in the nearest future." The joint communique on Podgorny's visit refers in conclusion to the "forthcoming visit" by as-Sadat to the USSR, and a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 30th reports that the UAR Government has submitted the treaty to the People's Assembly for ratification.

The aim of the treaty, according to Zavyalov in the roundtable program on the 30th, is to enlarge cooperation in practically all spheres--political, economic, and military. Of the treaty's 12 articles, Zavyalov singles out Article 7, which provides that the parties will regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states. The article further states that in the event of the development of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a danger to or violation of peace, the sides will contact each other "to concert their positions" with a view to removing the threat or reestablishing peace.

Article 8 of the treaty, on military cooperation, is given no particular prominence in Soviet propaganda. The only available broadcast commentary to focus on the military aspects of the treaty, a talk by a military commentator carried in Arabic on the 28th, cited Article 8 and also Article 9, which provides that neither party will enter into alliances and groupings or participate in measures directed against the other state. The treaty,

* The Soviet-West German treaty, signed on 12 August 1970, is still pending ratification.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 13 -

the commentator said, reflects military cooperation based on mutual interests in the struggle against imperialism. He called the Soviet armed forces "the guaranteed shield" of the Asian and African peoples and cited Nasir as "correctly" stating that the Afro-Asian peoples owe their victories to Soviet power. Accusing the "enemies" of the UAR and the USSR of distorting the significance of Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation, the commentator quoted as-Sadat as explaining that such cooperation has no aims which would endanger peace, but signifies only a consolidation of the UAR's defense capacity and its readiness to "repel the Israeli invaders."

In reporting as-Sadat's speech to the People's Assembly on 2 June, TASS the next day quotes him as saying the UAR "wanted this treaty and we signed it, having added new guarantees for a successful conclusion of our struggle." In recounting as-Sadat's explanation of the "new guarantees which were not defined before," TASS says the president stressed the clause on strengthening the UAR's defense capacity, calling it a "fundamentally new and important element of the treaty." The account fails to report as-Sadat's assurance that "there are no secret supplements to the treaty."

BACKGROUND ON The 50th anniversaries of Soviet "treaties of
USSR TREATIES friendship and good neighbor relations" with
Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey signed in 1921
(on 26 February, 28 February, and 16 March, respectively) were
hailed in a Voronin article in the April INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.*
Moscow's only other present treaty with a noncommunist country--
a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance"--is
with neighboring Finland, signed on 6 April 1948 and extended for
another 20 years in a protocol signed on 20 July 1970.

Moscow's wartime treaties with Britain and France were abrogated by the USSR in May 1955, as a consequence of the ratification of the Paris Agreements allowing the "rearmament" of West Germany. The treaties have not been renegotiated, but Kosygin during his February 1967 visit to London did surface the call for a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and "nonaggression." The de Gaulle

* The same issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS carries an article on diplomatic and treaty relations of the socialist states, listing all the countries with which the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations. With regard to treaties, it lists only those in force with other communist countries, as well as treaties between other communist states.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 14 -

visit to the USSR in the summer of 1966 and Kosygin's return visit to France in December of that year culminated in documents pledging extensive cooperation, but a treaty was not mentioned.

COMMUNIQUE STRESSES NASIR POLICIES, PLAYS DOWN PARTY TIES

The joint communique was released for publication early on the 28th, in advance of Podgornyy's final talk with as-Sadat and his departure on the 28th. Cairo indicated that this conversation lasted two and a half hours; TASS said merely that it was held in a "friendly, comradely atmosphere." Neither source gave any indication that other members of the two delegations were present.*

The communique contains elements common to past Soviet-Egyptian communiques, but also reflects some interesting stresses and omissions. Thus communiques in the past year, since Nasir's July 1970 visit to Moscow, have generally referred to the talks being held in an atmosphere of friendship and "complete" or "full" mutual understanding, while the present communique omits the descriptive adjective. As is customary, "views were exchanged" on a wide range of bilateral matters as well as on the Middle East situation and topical international questions. Like the last three previous communiques, views on such questions are not outlined. But the most recent communiques, on Foreign Minister Riyad's April visit to Moscow and Podgornyy's January visit to the UAR, referred to "full identity" or "unity" of views on topical international questions. The current communique fails to include such a formulation.

NASIR'S The present document does put particular stress on
COURSE Soviet appreciation of the UAR's determination to
 follow Nasir's "progressive, anti-imperialist course"
set out in the National Action Charter and the 30 March program,
as well as a course aimed at "insuring social progress and the
socialist transformation of society." Similarly, in his banquet
speeches on the 26th and 27th Podgornyy emphasized Soviet "satis-
faction" with the Egyptian desire, expressed, he said, by as-Sadat

* TASS on 26 May transmitted, then two hours later killed, a report that foreign ministers Gromyko and Riyad had met for a "friendly talk" on "problems under discussion" in the meetings.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 15 -

in his 20 May speech, to continue implementation of the charter and the 30 March program outlining the UAR's "course toward socialist transformation" and laid down during Nasir's lifetime. Concluding his second speech, Podgornyy wished the Egyptians every success on Nasir's path of socialist, economic, and progressive changes to "effectively oppose imperialism and reaction," remove the "consequences of Israeli aggression," and strengthen the close friendship and fruitful cooperation between the USSR and the UAR.

The brief Riyadh communique and the longer Podgornyy January communique made no mention of Nasir or of the Egyptian course of development. The communique on 'Ali Sabri's Moscow visit last December did refer to UAR resolve to advance on the road of socioeconomic development, and mentioned that the groundwork for Soviet-UAR friendship and cooperation had been laid in Nasir's lifetime. Not since Ponomarev led a CPSU delegation to Cairo earlier in December has a communique dealt with Nasir's "progressive, anti-imperialist" line and UAR social, economic, political, and progressive changes as set forth in the charter and the program. The Ponomarev communique--the first after Kosygin led the Soviet delegation to Nasir's funeral--sums up party talks and thus falls outside the customary pattern of Soviet-Egyptian communiqués at a state level.

CPSU-ASU RELATIONS CPSU-ASU relations are given notably brief treatment in the current communique, against the background of the disarray in the ASU, with party notables and the party's "secret organization" under investigation and the Central Committee's functions handed to the People's Assembly until the election of its new membership. The communique says merely that in the course of the meetings questions of the development of CPSU-ASU relations were discussed and "agreement was reached on concrete undertakings in fulfillment of the plans of the parties in 1971." The Podgornyy and 'Ali Sabri communiqués in January and December had stressed the parties' "friendship" ties and the mutual desire to develop these relations.

Podgornyy in his 27 May banquet speech did include "development of CPSU-ASU contacts" and "consolidation of ties among social organizations" in listing elements of Soviet-Egyptian relations. In a remark similar to that made by Brezhnev in his 14 May Tbilisi speech, Podgornyy declared that the eventual defeat of "imperialist plans" is assisted by the unity of the "progressive forces in every Arab country" and in the Arab world as a whole. In what may have been an indirect allusion to the recent Egyptian purge, Podgornyy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 16 -

remarked at the 26 May banquet that the Egyptian people's work to build a new life is taking place "in a complex situation" under conditions of opposition by imperialism and "internal and external reaction." PRAVDA in a 2 June editorial repeated this observation, without attribution to Podgornyy.

ARAB-ISRAELI
DISPUTE

The passage on the Middle East situation restates standard positions, again terming Israel, "with U.S. support," as an aggressor following an annexationist policy. The UAR's "constructive policy" of seeking a political settlement is viewed as creating favorable possibilities for establishing a just and lasting peace. Both sides again declare that such a peace can only be established on the basis of full Israeli withdrawal and implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. While the three previous communiqués also called at this point for insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, a reference to the Palestinian people comes almost as an afterthought in the current communique, following a passage on the new treaty and preceding the final paragraph on as-Sadat's forthcoming visit to Moscow.

MOSCOW COMPLAINS OF U.S. MEDIATION IN MIDEAST CONFLICT

Soviet propaganda continues to downgrade the U.S. role in a Middle East settlement and Secretary Rogers' talks in the area last month. In the vein of earlier propaganda charging the United States with assuming a self-appointed role as mediator, Podgornyy in his banquet speeches in Cairo complained that U.S. and other imperialists pose as "self-styled arbiters" of the conflict. On the 26th, he charged that although U.S. representatives have made many honeyed statements about their desire for peace in the Middle East, the settlement they favor is one which will allow the United States to dictate its will to the Arabs. Only Washington's interest in continued Israeli occupation of the Arab lands can explain its "surprisingly 'delicate' treatment of Israel," he declared. Without referring to Secretary Rogers' mission, Podgornyy asserted that "pretenses at peacefulness, no matter with what promises and ostentatious gestures they are accompanied," can mislead no one.

Podgornyy's remarks are reiterated, without attribution, in a 2 June PRAVDA editorial reviewed by TASS and broadcast in Arabic. And a Kudryavtsev article in IZVESTIYA, reported by TASS on the 3d, also takes up the charge that "U.S. 'mediation'" only seeks

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 17 -

to insure American control in the area. Kudryavtsev, according to TASS, also touches on U.S. "misrepresentation of the historical facts" to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's Middle East policy by telling the Arabs that "the Soviet Union is all but the successor of Czarist diplomacy."

A broadcast in Arabic on the 2d, dismissing "clamor" about a change in U.S. policy toward the Arab states, declared that "the ease with which an American secretary flies from one side to another over the cease-fire lines" does not mean that a change in U.S. policy can occur with similar ease. Who gives the aggressor funds and arms, it asks rhetorically, and has nothing to give the other side except promises?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 18 -

CUBAN FISHING BOATS

HAVANA ACCUSES U.S. OF ILLEGAL PROVOCATION, AGGRESSION

Cuban commentaries charge the United States with "an illegal and absolutely unjustified act of provocation" in extensive propaganda reacting to the U.S. seizure on 26 May of four Cuban fishing boats and eight fishermen for violating U.S. territorial waters off the U.S.-owned Dry Tortugas islands. The party organ GRANMA called the move "a new and stupid imperialist aggression against Cuban fishermen."

One atypical commentary--carried by PRENSA LATINA on 1 June--not too subtly linked a demand for release of the boats and fishermen with the question of Cuban disposition of the Pan American airliner hijacked to Cuba on 29 May. But in reporting on 2 June that the airliner and its crew and passengers would be released, Havana media conveyed no hint of any connection with the disposition of the Cuban fishermen, four of whom were returned to their ship on 31 May while four "captains" were held for trial on 7 June. On the 3d the Havana domestic radio announced that the Pan American jetliner had returned to the United States after payment by the Swiss embassy, in behalf of the United States, of \$27,527.25 covering the cost of the plane's stay in Cuba.

REPLAY OF REACTION
TO FEBRUARY INCIDENT

Havana's reaction to the fishing-boat incident has been markedly similar to its propaganda treatment of the seizure of four base ships and some 50 crewmen on 24-25 February. The ships and crews were released in that instance after payment of a \$25,000 fine by each of the four captains. Then, as in the present instance, Havana media waited more than 24 hours before reporting the seizures, then came out with news items factually recounting the incident and contending that the Cuban boats were well within international waters when they were apprehended. In connection with the current incident, PRENSA LATINA claimed on 27 May that the base ships were 35 miles west of the Dry Tortugas and that the auxiliary boats which were apprehended had only "an independent range of approximately three miles."

In the wake of the February incident, 14 ships of three flotillas were quickly dispatched to the location of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 19 -

seizure in a well-publicized assertion of Cuba's right to fish in what it considered to be international waters. Similarly, PRENSA LATINA announced on 31 May that "more Cuban ships are now en route to an area 35 miles from Dry Tortugas," and Havana's domestic service noted on 2 June that some 30 Cuban Gulf fleet boats--including one with the Gulf fishing fleet director on board--would soon be fishing in the "international waters" in the "fishing area 35 miles from Tortugas light."

Charges of mistreatment of the captured fishermen and continuing U.S. harassment of other Cuban fishing boats outside U.S. territorial waters have been publicized repeatedly, as in February. Thus Havana quotes the fishermen as complaining after their release that the food was poor and that they were given only one meal a day. They are also quoted as claiming that their captors abused, threatened, and bribed them in an effort to induce them to seek political asylum in the United States. The fishing boats remaining on location in international waters are said to have charged that "a Yankee seaplane" was continuing to make passes over the "international fishing area" and that "a Yankee coast guard cutter has also been cruising near the Cuban boats."

Reminiscent of the February propaganda, Havana media highlight domestic Cuban indignation by recounting public demonstrations and protest meetings and publicizing interviews with friends and relatives of the detained fishermen. GRANMA has been devoting substantial space to such coverage. Charges that the incident constitutes a deliberate provocation are typified by GRANMA's complaint on 29 May that Cuban fishermen have been "the favorite target of aggression by the United States and Cuban traitors for the past 10 years" and that "this new attack" on fishermen "reveals the aims of the imperialists, who insist on aggressions against our economy and the most brazen and unacceptable blackmail against Cuba." Implying that the United States had artificially created the incident and was attempting to inflate it, GRANMA asserted that "the arbitrary measures taken by Yankee officials are so flagrant that in order to carry out a new provocation against Cuba they have not had the slightest hesitation in presenting as 'captains' four simple fishermen doing their job in small auxiliary boats" used by the base ships. The February seizure, PRENSA LATINA had said on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 20 -

26 February, "evinces the weeks-long search for a dispute that again makes relations between Cuba and the United States red hot." And in the same vein, participants in a PRENSA LATINA commentators' discussion on 27 February suggested that the United States was then looking for a new crisis "to divert international attention from the so-called tuna war" with Ecuador.

HIJACKING INCIDENT Although one domestic service newscast on 31 May juxtaposed a report of the fishermen's capture with an account of the hijacking of the Pan American airliner to Cuba on the 29th, there was no general effort to link the two incidents, and the hijack story received very limited play. But a direct connection was drawn in one monitored commentary: PRENSA LATINA on 1 June implied that the disposition of the airliner would be related to U.S. treatment of the eight fishermen and suggested that while the coincidence of the two incidents was fortuitous, there were precedents in the February fishing boat affair and in the earlier incident involving the kidnapping of Cuban fishermen by Cuban exiles in May 1970.

The commentary claimed that U.S. motives differed this time from the motives in February, terming the February incident the result of "an internal contradiction between U.S. federal and state authorities" and stating that Cuba reacted "with moderation and paid the fine" while not admitting to any violation of U.S. jurisdiction. This time, it said, the provocation was met "with a round refusal: the Cuban revolution did not accept the pressures, would not pay one red cent in fines, and demanded the immediate release of the fishermen." It was at this point, PRENSA LATINA went on to say, that the "unexpected event" of the Pan Am airliner's arrival in Havana occurred.

Noting that the passengers and crewmembers of the "rerouted plane" had been "invited for a stay at a Havana hotel, since the technical difficulties preventing takeoff might turn out to be fairly prolonged," the commentary recalled that in the May 1970 kidnapping the Cuban Government had been unable to attend to the release of two hijacked planes "due to the manifold problems caused by the kidnapping of the fishermen." It added that "the planes left right after the release of the fishermen." Similarly, the commentary said, following the 2 March release of the four captains whose boats were seized in February "the revolutionary government settled the problems involved in the rerouting to Cuba of an Eastern Airlines plane."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 21 -

FORCES IN EUROPE

MOSCOW SAYS U.S. PRESSURES NATO ALLIES ON BREZHNEV PROPOSAL

Low-level Moscow propaganda continues to contrast "widespread support" for Brezhnev's 14 May call to start negotiations on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe with the "negative" U.S. attitude. Propagandists claim that U.S. representatives at the recent series of high-level NATO meetings sought to pressure the alliance members to resist the USSR's "initiative." However, Moscow reported without comment--in a 2 June domestic service broadcast--that President Nixon in his press conference on the 1st said Washington has completed a study of mutual force reduction, and that, after consultation with NATO foreign ministers in Lisbon on 3 and 4 June, the United States and its allies "will start discussing that issue with the Soviet Union and other interested countries."

Comment treating the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (25-26 May) in Mittenwald, West Germany, and the Brussels meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (28 May) took Secretary Laird to task, alleging that he "set the tone" for the "militarist" gatherings and was bent on "pressuring" his allies on the force reduction issue. For example, a participant in the 30 May domestic service commentators' roundtable show said that Laird warned the participants of the Mittenwald meeting that there must be no "ad libbing" in response to the USSR's proposal. A TASS report on the 29th on the Brussels meeting said that Laird urged other NATO member countries to increase the military potential of the alliance's armed forces in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean as "the basis for negotiations with the socialist countries. Thereby he unequivocally showed that the United States continues to come out for talks from the position of strength."

The attack on the U.S. posture is repeated in propaganda on the opening of the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Lisbon. Thus a commentary by Beglov on the 3d transmitted by TASS says that despite official Washington statements about its interest in European force reduction, the eve of the opening of the Lisbon session "was marked by a still more frank pressure by the United States on its allies towards

CONFIDENTIAL

- 22 -

forcing a new round of military preparations within the Atlantic bloc." A domestic service broadcast on the 2d, questioning Secretary Rogers' motives in meeting with other NATO foreign ministers on the force reduction issue a day before the formal opening of the NATO session, observed that Washington "is against detente and is trying to block the socialist countries' peace initiative." It concluded that the impression is being created that Rogers, during the preliminary meeting, is trying "to force the West European allies to accept the American viewpoint."

Propaganda on the Brezhnev proposal has avoided discussing the possible forum in which the talks might be held, and it does not link the proposal with a European security conference. However, current propaganda stressing the importance of a European security conference does continue to recall the proposal in the memorandum of last June's Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers that an agenda item of a conference could be the creation of a permanent body where the issue of "foreign" troop reductions in Europe could be discussed. Moscow has not been heard to acknowledge Deputy Foreign Minister Tsarapkin's remarks at a 1 June Copenhagen press conference--reported by Budapest radio and by AFP--that the issue of troop cuts could be discussed by a working group at a European security conference. According to the AFP version, Tsarapkin also suggested that a European security conference might call a special meeting to discuss force reduction.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 23 -

USSR AND ROMANIA

MOSCOW EVINCES DISPLEASURE OVER CEAUSESCU VISIT TO PRC

Moscow's disquiet over the visit to Peking of Romania's Ceausescu has been reflected in its sparse coverage of the trip and in comment combining attacks on Peking's schismatic line with demands for cohesion within the Soviet bloc. A RED STAR article on 1 June--the day Ceausescu arrived in Peking--warned of the dangers both of Peking's policies and of neutralist tendencies among unnamed socialist countries. Similarly, Soviet apprehension over Bucharest's maverick course was registered in a Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania on 31 May denouncing the "splittist" activities of the Chinese leaders and stressing a need for coordinating foreign policy among the Soviet bloc countries within the disciplined framework of bilateral treaties and the Warsaw Pact.

Soviet media, which did not report the Romanian or Chinese announcements of Ceausescu's tour of the Far East, have so far limited their coverage to brief reports of the Romanian delegation's stopover in Novosibirsk, its message to Soviet leaders while flying over the Soviet Union, and the group's arrival in Peking. Radio Moscow's domestic service relegated the latter report to 10th place in its newscast. A broadcast to China, however, played up the Romanian leadership's greetings to the Soviets, noting that "they extended warm, comradely salutations."

RED STAR The 1 June RED STAR article, by Maj. Gen. Ye.
ARTICLE Sulimov, draws on conservative themes reflecting
 the defense establishment's interests in arguing
the case for Soviet military strength and decrying Western
arms expansion. The article claims that Soviet military
strength has been a major factor in maintaining world peace
for the past quarter of a century, and it warns tendentiously
that "the love of peace of the socialist countries does not
rid their peoples of the necessity of developing military
affairs, of strengthening their defenses." Buttrussing its
case for a strong military posture, the article routinely
cites the Vietnam war and the Middle East situation as
evidence of the continuing "aggressive" character of
Western imperialism.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 24 -

As if to counter any tendency to play down the need for Soviet bloc military strength and cohesion in an atmosphere of detente, the article stresses that "it is impossible to successfully fight against the world bloc of imperialism alone, in isolation. This has a meaning for the socialist states and the other detachments of the liberation movement." It is in this context that the article links the Chinese and neutralist lines as detrimental to the communist cause:

It is obvious what harm is done by the line of the Chinese leaders at splitting the socialist system and the world communist movement, and also the insolvent line of "neutrality," the so-called "nonalignment" policy of countries of socialism. Marxists-Leninists cannot be "neutral" in the international class struggle, for such "neutrality" only benefits the imperialists.

Sulimov's censure of socialist countries which would go it alone in the face of the imperialist menace may be in part responsive to Ceausescu's comments on military policy in his speech marking the Romanian party's 50th anniversary on 7 May. In an evident effort to play down the importance of the Warsaw Pact, Ceausescu took note of its "temporary" nature and went on to stress the consequent need to develop one's own national forces and to pursue military contacts with "all" the socialist countries. He also spoke of the need to create conditions that will make it possible to abolish NATO and the Pact, such as the liquidation of military bases on the territories of other states and withdrawal of foreign troops to their own national territories.

BROADCAST TO ROMANIA On the eve of Ceausescu's arrival in Peking, a Radio Moscow commentary broadcast only in Romanian on 31 May developed similar themes in stressing the need "to coordinate the foreign and defense policies of the socialist countries." The commentator pointedly noted that the Romanian-Soviet friendship treaty signed on 7 July 1970 called for the two sides "to consult each other on the important

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 25 -

international problems concerning the interests of both countries to coordinate their positions."* He added that "the need to work out and pursue a joint coordinated policy of the socialist countries was given juridical expression in the Warsaw Treaty as well, in Article 3." The imperialists, the commentator continued, understand the importance of joint socialist policies, and that is why they are using "all sorts of opponents of socialist unity to split the united front of world socialism"--a possible allusion to recent Sino-U.S. developments.

In this context he went on to attack the "splittist" activities of the Chinese, who are "pursuing a line which is hostile to the USSR and other socialist countries." Taking a swipe at Romania's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, he concluded: "The overwhelming majority of the communist and workers parties categorically condemn Peking's foreign policy line. Genuine Marxists-Leninists realize that today, when the confrontation between the two world systems is becoming sharper, the all-round political cooperation of the socialist countries and its constant improvement is of great importance."

* Article 9 reads: "The high contracting parties will consult together on all important international problems which involve the interests of both countries with the aim of concerting their positions"--a formula that makes consultations obligatory but could be interpreted by the Romanians as leaving them some leeway for dissent. The current Bulgarian-Soviet treaty is more rigid: The two sides "will consult together on all important international problems which involve the interests of both countries and concert their positions."

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1971

- 26 -

CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS

INTERVENTION ISSUE CONTINUES TO RATTLE BEHIND THE SCENES

The issue of the 1968 intervention remained close beneath the surface of the resolute show of unity at the 25-29 May Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress, which opened with Husak's speech expressing thanks "to you personally, Comrade Brezhnev" and to the other visiting Warsaw Five first secretaries collectively for the invasion and closed with a resolution reiterating the CPCZ's gratitude.

All the visiting Warsaw Five leaders registered their support for Husak's leadership in speeches to the congress on the 26th, and all except Hungary's Kadar brushed over the invasion to focus on Husak's success in eradicating the vestiges of the Dubcek era; Kadar addressed himself directly to the intervention in remarks rationalizing Hungary's participation, and he was more defensive and more explicit in a speech outside the congress halls two days later. The lower-level delegates from Romania and Yugoslavia predictably restated their governments' insistence on the importance of nonintervention. And the Italian CP circulated a speech critical of the intervention which its delegate was not permitted to give.

BREZHNEV, GIEREK, Brezhnev's speech, using such invective
HONECKER, ZHIVKOV as "the muddy wave of antisocialist
hysteria and bourgeois nationalist fever"
to characterize 1968 Czechoslovakia, was brief and general on
the subject of the invasion itself. Citing Husak, the Soviet
leader hailed the "thousands and thousands of Czechoslovak
communists who at a difficult time displayed high principle,
firm will, and staunchness in defense of everything" that the
socialist builders in the CSSR had struggled for. He added that
the Soviet communists "fully share the evaluation of the 1968-69
events" contained in the "Lessons" document of the December 1970
CPCZ plenum and in Husak's opening congress report.

Poland's Gieriek, the GDR's Honecker, and Bulgaria's Zhivkov
were more restrained than Brezhnev with respect to the
pre-invasion period, focusing on Husak's achievements in
"consolidation" since April 1969. Gieriek broached the
intervention only in noting that "the attack a few years ago
of revisionism, the right, and reaction has been broken by

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1971

- 27 -

your party," which has "repelled the antisocialist forces." Honecker said that "any attempt to pry a socialist country out of the community is doomed to failure from the outset" and that "the socialist achievements of Czechoslovakia are as dear and precious to us as our own." And Zhivkov recalled that "in that difficult struggle, you showed the world that there was no power that could tear the Czechoslovak communists from the ranks of the world communist movement." True to form, Zhivkov was fulsome on the subject of fealty to Moscow and Brezhnev, referring to the ties of all those present at the congress "with the first socialist country of the world and its representatives, the CPSU and General Secretary Comrade Brezhnev."

KADAR Hungary's Kadar, the reluctant participant in the intervention, dwelled at length on a parallel between Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and expressed typically sympathetic sentiments: "We fully understood the gravity and complex nature of the situation which our Czechoslovak comrades had to face in the years of the recent past." He went on to explain that in August 1968 "the idea of proletarian internationalism, the cause of socialism, solidarity with a friend and brother guided us Hungarians when, together with our allies, we came to the assistance of the working class and progressive forces the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." Kadar also, uniquely, joined Husak in referring in positive terms to the January 1968 plenum which ousted Novotny, pointing to the "basically correct socialist aspirations" worked out at the 1966 CPCZ congress "and at the subsequent Central Committee plenum in January 1968."

Kadar was more explicit and more defensive in a speech at a Czechoslovak factory in Usti nad Labem on the 28th. Referring to the danger of "counterrevolution," which he had not mentioned in his congress speech, he said Hungary believes the intervention "was necessary in the extraordinary situation where every achievement of the Czechoslovak working people was seriously endangered and internal counterrevolution and imperialist intervention threatened." He acknowledged that "there are people who argue whether such a grave and imminent danger prevailed," and he went on to insist that the Hungarians in August 1968 were motivated by "the intention of preventing an even worse development, by internationalism, and by the intention of selflessly helping the Czechoslovak working people, and by nothing else."

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1971

- 28 -

RCP, LCY The Romanian and Yugoslav party delegates, both
DELEGATES lower in rank than those at the last CPCZ congress
 in 1966, reiterated the standard positions of their
parties on the importance of "independence, sovereignty, and
noninterference" in interparty relations. While RCP Executive
Committee member Popescu managed to avoid any references to
Czechoslovak problems, past or present, LCY Presidium member
Gazi pointed to "difficulties" which had faced the CPCZ and
remarked that "the way in which they were resolved" had "evoked
different assessments" among the world progressive forces.
He added cryptically that "the LCY stand on the 1968 events
is known" and that "the development of our mutual relations since
then is also known."

WESTERN CP'S The French Communist Party's Guyot glossed over
 the issue, recalling that "in the recent period,
certain disagreements have appeared between our two parties."
Such differences, he said, "should not result in a weakening of
the main relations which unite all communist parties."

The more forthcoming stand of the intractable Italian party was
suppressed at the congress. Belgrade's TANJUG on the 28th
reported an announcement that day by the Italian party's press
department in Rome that "the presidium of the Czechoslovak
congress 'did not consider it necessary to allow the representa-
tive of the Italian Communist Party, Sergio Segre, to make his
speech of welcome.'" The announcement added that "for this
reason, the Directorate of the Italian CP has decided to
distribute the full text of this speech to all foreign and
Czechoslovak journalists" in Prague.

The text of Segre's speech, published in L'UNITA on the 29th,
bluntly restates the Italian party's "differences with regard
to the military intervention of five Warsaw Pact countries in
Czechoslovakia" and adds: "We do not believe that any elements
have emerged meanwhile which could induce us to change these
positions of ours." Segre stresses that his party's stand is
based on "the firm belief that the independence and sovereignty
of every communist party and every state are the absolute foundation
of internationalism."

The British and Spanish parties, which had also vocally opposed the
invasion, were not represented at the congress. The Spanish CP's
clandestine Radio Independent Spain took the occasion of the
congress opening to reiterate the view that socialism in fact was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 29 -

not in danger in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In a broadcast on the 25th the radio took direct issue with the rationale for the intervention expounded in the Czechoslovak party's "Lessons" document, commenting on the "lack of facts and proof" to support the contention that there was a serious counterrevolutionary threat dictating counteraction.

The Austrian CP's delegate, Politburo member Fuernberg, backed away from the opposition to the invasion voiced by party chairman Muhri at the June 1969 international party conference. Registering a shift that has evolved since the purge of "revisionist" elements from the party in the fall of 1969, flowing from a dispute focused on the invasion issue, Fuernberg told the congress that "today, everyone can see the danger which threatened socialism and peace from the onslaught of hostile forces." CTK quoted him on the 27th as stating that the CPCZ "has eventually been able to cope with the situation despite tremendous difficulties" and as implying acceptance of the CPCZ's "Lessons" document in the remark that "the lessons you have drawn are of great importance to communists from other countries."

Statements of support for the invasion came from the delegates of the Indian, Iraqi, Canadian, and U.S. parties and the West German KPD and DKP. Such statements were typified by that of the CPUSA's Roscoe Proctor, who was quoted by the Prague radio on the 28th as stressing the "counterrevolutionary" situation that obtained in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and as adding: "Our party fully supports the actions of the socialist countries before and after 21 August and now supports the decisive actions you have taken to improve the situation in your party and your nation."

CONGRESS DEEPENS PURGE OF DUBCEK-ORIENTED LIBERALS

The new rosters of leading party bodies announced by Husak on 29 May showed a radical housecleaning in the Central Committee, heretofore not as extensively hit by the purge which had effectively removed all Dubcek-oriented figures from the party Presidium by the time the congress convened. Only about one third (67 out of 188) members and candidates of the CPCZ Central Committee of mid-1970 are retained on the new Central Committee. Such liberal leaders as Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and Spacek had already been dropped from the Central Committee by mid-1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1971

- 30 -

The new Central Committee is smaller than the previous one, now consisting of 160 full members and candidates.

The last, relatively conservative remnant of the Dubcek orientation, Evzen Erban, was dropped from the CPCZ Presidium and replaced by ultraconservative Karel Hoffmann, who had only been named a candidate member in February. Dalibor Hanes, the conservative chairman of the Federal Assembly, was dropped from the list of Presidium candidates, and the vacancy created by Hoffmann's promotion was filled by Miloslav Hruskovic. The only other change in the top bodies is the addition of Frantisek Ondrich to the party Secretariat.

"Modifications" of the party statutes by the congress include the change in Husak's title from First Secretary to General Secretary. Husak becomes the third ruling party leader, after Brezhnev and Ceausescu, to hold this title.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 31 -

FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CPCZ CONGRESS REITERATES POSITION ON MUNICH AGREEMENT

Speeches at the 14th Czechoslovak Party Congress by General Secretary Husak and Presidium member Bilak, as well as the final congress resolution publicized 29 May, reasserted the Czechoslovak position on the 1938 Munich Agreement and again called on the FRG to recognize the agreement as "invalid ab initio, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom." The congress materials contain no explicit reference to the Bonn-Prague exploratory talks seeking a resolution of the issue to clear the way for formal negotiations on normalization of relations--a silence in keeping with Prague media's general circumspection about the talks since they began at the end of March. But there are emphatic restatements of the uncompromising Czechoslovak public position, aired repeatedly before the talks began and pressed in stereotyped language since then in comment on the general question of relations with West Germany.

In his report to the CPCZ congress on 25 May, Husak cited the "still unresolved relations" between Czechoslovakia and the FRG as "one of the unresolved problems which doubtless has an effect on the development of conditions in Europe." The "chief obstacle" to a settlement of bilateral relations, he said, is Bonn's "untenable position that the Munich diktat was a valid international treaty," when in fact it was "forced upon Czechoslovakia under threat and violence." Hence, he continued, "the justified requirement for declaring the Munich Agreement null and void ab initio, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom, follows from the irrefutable reality that this so-called agreement was a part of the criminal Nazi conspiracy against peace and a step provoking World War II and was a crime perpetrated against Czechoslovakia." Husak said the FRG can prove that it wants a settlement of relations with the CSSR that would "overcome the evil past" by accepting "the unequivocal political, moral, and international legal conclusions" that flow from the "historical truth" of the Munich Agreement and by recognizing the invalidity of the agreement ab initio. Czechoslovakia, he added, "expects" the FRG to take these steps.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 32 -

Declaring that it was not Czechoslovakia's fault that relations with the FRG were not normalized, Bilak told the congress on the 27th that the Czechoslovak people "can never accept the theory voiced in the FRG about both sides being guilty and some sort of mutual settling of accounts." Pointing to Husak's remarks on the issue, Bilak went on to say that "there will never be an understanding of the 'Munich approach' to the liquidation of the Munich crime." While insisting that "our people do not call for vengeance, they do not call for revenge, they are not interested in cultivating distrust of the FRG," Bilak recalled the suffering imposed on Czechoslovakia by three "imperialist" German wars and referred to "the mortal danger" that even now threatens Czechoslovakia, encouraged by "radio stations and press agencies in the FRG." The "crime of Munich can never be passed over or covered up by silence," he said.

The congress resolution repeated the Czechoslovak stand on the "invalidity of the Munich Agreement ab initio, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom," adding that the CSSR will "continue to strive for normalization of relations" between the two countries and "expects" the Bonn government to reciprocate Czechoslovak "good will by concrete deeds."

SUPPORT FROM Brezhnev and East Germany's Honecker expressed
SOVIET BLOC full and explicit support for the Czechoslovak position on the Munich Agreement in their congress speeches, while Hungary's Kadar and Poland's Gierek spoke of the invalidity of the agreement without adding the phrase "with all the consequences ensuing therefrom." Bulgaria's Zhivkov confined himself to a general statement of satisfaction with Prague's European policy. And the Romanian party representative, Popescu, stressing Romania's "paramount" concern for European security, simply called for normalization of relations among all states.

Brezhnev brought up the Munich Agreement issue in the context of "attempts to sabotage" the quest for European security, particularly efforts "to boycott the constructive initiatives of the socialist states" by airing "a whole new concept" whereby European problems must be solved "all at once and in one package." Such maneuvers, he said, are complicating the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn and the convening of an all-European conference and are hindering the settlement of other

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 33 -

problems, "including such an important issue as Bonn's recognition of the invalidity of the Munich Agreement ab initio, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom."

Honecker repeated the litany, demanding that the FRG recognize "the invalidity of the predatory Munich Agreement ab initio, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom."

RUDE PRAVO ON
SUDETEN MEETING

Indirect praise for the Brandt government was conveyed in an article in the CPCZ organ RUDE PRAVO on 1 June by its Bonn correspondent Faix. In a dispatch on the Nuremberg rallies of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaften at the end of May, reviewed by CTK, Faix noted that the leaders of the Sudeten German "revanchists" were still urging the Bonn government not to recognize the invalidity of the "Munich diktat" and were still expressing a desire to return to their "old homeland." But he pointed out that for the first time no Bonn minister spoke at the Sudeten German Days rally and that for the first time the Sudeten Landsmannschaften leaders did not receive a greetings message from the Federal Chancellor.

Czechoslovak media have all but ignored the issue of the Sudeten Germans since their considerable propaganda buildup for the first round of Prague-Bonn exploratory talks at the end of March. Czechoslovak comment from January through March stressed the "positive attitude" of the Brandt-Scheel government, compared with that of the previous CDU/CSU governments, in agreeing to begin talks on normalizing relations with Czechoslovakia. A constant theme was the general opposition to Brandt's Ostpolitik among the Sudeten German and other expellee organizations, joined by "right-wing" leaders of the CDU and CSU, and particularly their opposition to recognition of the Munich Agreement as invalid ab initio.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 34 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SHAKEUP OF UKRAINIAN WRITERS UNION AT MAY CONGRESS

The 18-21 May Ukrainian Writers Union congress has concluded with the removal of moderate Oles Honchar as chairman and a major victory for his hardline critics. The victory was limited, however, since Honchar was replaced by an outsider, Yuriy Smolich, who has not participated publicly in the infighting between the moderates led by Honchar and the conservatives led by Vasil Kozachenko. Although Kozachenko was elevated to the No. 2 position in the writers union, the moderates continue to be represented in the leadership and there are no signs that a crackdown is in the offing. The decision to remove Honchar appears to have been reached after the Ukrainian party congress in March; both he and Kozachenko had become full Central Committee members at that time, whereas Smolich became only a candidate member.

As a result of the changes, chairman Honchar and deputy chairman Leonid Novichenko, who had defended Honchar's novel "The Cathedral" against Kozachenko and other critics, were dropped from the top leadership; Kozachenko was elevated to first deputy chairman replacing conservative Yuriy Zbanatskiy, who assumed Kozachenko's former posts (Zbanatskiy had replaced Kozachenko as Kiev writers union head on 6 May):

<u>Writers Union Leadership</u>	<u>February 1969</u>	<u>May 1971</u>
Chairman:	Honchar	Smolich
First Deputy Chairman:	Zbanatskiy	Kozachenko
Deputy Chairman and Kiev chief:	Kozachenko	Zbanatskiy
Deputy Chairman:	Novichenko	Zahrebelnyy
Deputy Chairman:		Oliynik
Organizational Secretary:	Zahrebelnyy	Soldatenko

The new chairman, Yuriy Smolich, going on 71, was deputy chairman until the last writers congress in November 1966. More recently he has been head of the Society for Cultural Ties With Ukrainians Abroad and has not appeared to play an active role in writers union politics. He did not speak at the writers union congress, although he was the only writer to address the March Ukrainian party congress. New deputy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 35 -

chairman Pavlo Zahrebelnyy--who gave the main report on prose at the congress--appears to be a moderate, judging from past conservative criticism of his writings. The other new deputy chairman, Boris Oliynik, is apparently also a moderate: While deputy editor of the liberal youth journal DNIPRO he was attacked by the Ukrainian Komsomol leadership in 1967 for writing a poem depicting history too negatively and using "the so-called method of the 'truth of fact'" as against the "truth of life" (MOLOD UKRAINY, 25 February 1967).

Honchar and Novichenko were retired ceremoniously with commendations from the new leadership for their years of service. Honchar's writings were praised by several speakers, although no one mentioned his controversial novel "The Cathedral." Honchar and Novichenko remain on the new 29-man presidium of the board, along with fellow moderates Lyubomir Dmiterko, editor of the liberal journal VITCHIZNA; Yuriy Mushketik, editor of DNIPRO; Dmitro Pavlichko, new editor of VSESVIT, and such outspoken conservatives as Yakiv Bash, Yuriy Zbanatskiy, Vasil Kozachenko, Aleksandr Korneychuk, Petro Panch, Natan Rybak, and Mikola Shamota.

Besides Honchar and Novichenko, other losers are Oleksiy Poltoratskiy, who was removed as VSESVIT editor the day before the congress opened (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 18 May), and young writer Vitaliy Korotich, who was one of the nine secretaries elected at the last congress but was not elected to the new presidium. Poltoratskiy, a leading critic of Honchar and Pavlichko and of dissident writer Ivan Dzyuba, had himself come under heavy fire for ideological errors in early 1970.* Korotich and Poltoratskiy were elected to the 69-man board, however, along with the frequently criticized Yevhen Hutsalo and Ivan Drach, a 1968 protest signer. The Auditing Commission contains two notable conservatives, Vitaliy Petlyovanyy and Anatoliy Khorunzhiy, as well as 1968 protest-signer Volodimir Kolomiyets.

FACTIONAL STRUGGLE The struggle over the Ukrainian writers' union leadership surfaced in 1968 when the Dnepropetrovsk party leaders, writers union party committee head Kozachenko, and other conservatives launched a campaign against Honchar's "The Cathedral." A reorganization of the leadership

* See the TRENDS of 13 May 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 36 -

in December 1968 placed Kozachenko on an equal footing with Honchar, but another reorganization less than two months later downgraded Kozachenko to deputy chairman--behind chairman Honchar and new first deputy chairman Zbanatskiy.

Kozachenko appeared to gain some ground in late 1969 when, as Kiev writers union head, he initiated the expulsion of dissident writer Ivan Dzyuba from the writers union. Kozachenko again became active in late 1970, amid signs of gains by the Dnepropetrovsk faction.* He criticized certain literary works at a 17-18 November Kharkov plenum of the Ukrainian Writers Union board (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 20 November), assailed Solzhenitsyn at a 26 November Kiev writers union party meeting (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 1 December), and warned against foreign radio and television broadcasts at a 2 December Kiev writers union board meeting (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 4 December). In March 1971 he was awarded the Ukrainian state literary prize by the Ukrainian Central Committee and Council of Ministers (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 12 March) along with conservative writer Korneychuk, also a critic of "The Cathedral."

Honchar's position appeared unimpaired, however, and he continued his normal duties. The 27 January 1971 Ukrainian Writers Union plenum which convoked the May congress assigned the key roles to Honchar and fellow moderate Zahrebelnyy. The commission created by the plenum to make preparations for the congress was headed by the same two men, and Honchar was assigned the opening speech at the congress and Zahrebelnyy the key report on prose (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 29 January).

When the 17-20 March 1971 Ukrainian party congress opened, Honchar alone among the writers union leaders was elected to the leading bodies of the congress. Despite Shelest's moderate criticism of literary deviations and Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary Vatchenko's pointed call for Ukrainian ideological leaders to "significantly improve the choice of leading cadres" of creative unions, Honchar was elected to the new Ukrainian Central Committee, along with Kozachenko

* For example, Dnepropetrovsk city first secretary Anatoliy Ulanov, a bitter critic of Honchar, became cadres chief of the Ukrainian Central Committee. See the TRENDS of 21 October 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 37 -

and Korneychuk. Moreover, these three men were the only Ukrainian writers elected delegates to the CPSU congress. Unlike Kozachenko and Korneychuk, Honchar had not been elected to the Ukrainian Central Committee in 1966, nor had he been a delegate to the CPSU congress.

Following the Ukrainian congress both Kozachenko and Honchar appeared to be vying for Shelest's favor. Kozachenko gratuitously praised Shelest's recent book in articles in the 24 March Moscow LITERARY GAZETTE and the 30 March LITERATURNA UKRAINA. At a 29 April Kiev writers union meeting to nominate Shelest to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Kozachenko praised Shelest as a "brilliant example," only to be outdone by Honchar's long and effusive speech calling Shelest an "outstanding figure of the party and state" and "true son" of the fatherland. Honchar praised Shelest's recent book and Shelest's "respect" and "sincere interest" in the development of Ukrainian literature and his ability to combine demandingness with "a desire to help, to give thoughtful advice, to inspire, to support all that is honest, creative and talented." LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 30 April quoted him as saying that "our writers and artists owe much to the constant leadership of the Central Committee, and especially Petro Yukhimovich Shelest"

The first sign of change in the literary hierarchy occurred on 6 May, when the Kiev writers union held its report-and-election conference and elected Zbanatskiy to replace Kozachenko as Kiev union head (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 11 May). Honchar made one of the main speeches, however, and was elected to the Kiev board.

HARDENING OF LITERARY LINE When the writers union congress opened on 18 May Shelest took a harder line in his opening speech than in earlier speeches, putting the writers on notice that further changes were in order. He repeated his Ukrainian party congress statement that "not only young but sometimes even well known writers" produce "politically immature" works, but he went on to criticize the writers union board and party committee for not preventing ideological and artistic failures and for poorly directing the work of its journals, papers, and publishing house. He singled out the journals VITCHIZNA, PRAPOR, and VSESVIT for "serious shortcomings," adding ominously that "obviously, the essence of the matter is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE TRENDS
3 JUNE 1971

- 38 -

in correctly choosing cadres and being demanding to them." He also called on party obkoms to intervene more directly in the work of local writers union organizations and to raise the responsibility of local writers (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 19 May).

Shelest's criticism of the union's work appeared to stir little response in the main reports on the various fields of literature, which were generally moderate in tone. The only harsh speeches were by Honchar's critics, Natan Rybak and Kozachenko. Kozachenko, who spoke toward the end of the congress, was the only speaker to praise Shelest's "just criticism" of the work of the writers union board and party committee--a remark contained only in the 22 May RADYANSKA UKRAINA version of his speech and not in the longer 25 May LITERATURNA UKRAINA version. However, the congress' resolution did contain an admission of "errors" by the union and of "ideological and artistic unclarity in the work of some comrades" as well as a pledge to "unanimously join the party's strict warning to certain writers who sometimes slip into distorted portrayal of Soviet reality and unwittingly aid our ideological enemies" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 25 May).

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1971

- 39 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KANG SHENG REAPPEARS AS MAO GREETES ROMANIAN DELEGATION

Politburo Standing Committee member Kang Sheng, absent from public view since November 1970, was reported by NCNA on 3 June to have been present when Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao received the Romanian party-government delegation led by Ceausescu. The NCNA report indicates that Kang--reportedly censured at the second Central Committee plenum last September--has resumed his former rank if not his former influence: NCNA lists him after Chou En-lai, ahead of other Politburo members present, and also mentions him along with Mao, Lin, and Chou as participants in a "friendly conversation" with the Romanians.

Together with the recently intensified campaign against "idealist apriorism"--apparently directed against Chen Po-ta, the other Standing Committee member who has been absent from public view--Kang's reappearance suggests that Chen will now alone among the top leaders bear the onus for "ultraleftist" deviations during the cultural revolution. Kang's position has all along seemed less precarious than Chen's; he continued to appear for several months after Chen dropped out of sight last summer, and his wife, Tsao Yi-ou, has continued to make publicized appearances. Still in doubt is the fate of several provincial leaders who have recently fallen from power or whose provinces have lagged in forming party committees. If Kang has regained his former influence, he may help such embattled leaders as Pan Fu-sheng in Heilungkiang to retain their positions.

The extent of Kang's comeback has yet to be demonstrated. He was not reported present along with other active Politburo members at festivities for Ceausescu prior to Mao's reception of the Romanian leader, a fact which could indicate that he has not regained his full authority.

NEW PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE ANNOUNCED FOR TIENTSIN

Formation of a party committee for Tientsin was announced by NCNA on 30 May, leaving only the five provinces of Heilungkiang, Tibet, Szechwan, Ningsia, and Yunnan without rebuilt party structures.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JUNE 1971

- 40 -

The namelist for the Tientsin party committee contains no surprises, with the revolutionary committee chairman and other officials in the local power structure named to leadership positions in the new body. Civilian provincial chief Hsieh Hsueh-kung, who was named first secretary, heads the committee's seven-man leadership group. Hsieh, Tientsin's original chairman, is also the first political commissar of the Tientsin Garrison. Prior to the cultural revolution, he was a secretary on the now defunct North China Bureau. Wu Tai, a military man previously identified only as a deputy political commissar within the Peking Military Region (MR), was named second secretary.

Of the five secretaries named, three have primarily military backgrounds. Liu Cheng, a revolutionary committee vice-chairman, has been identified as a responsible figure in the local PLA units since 1967. Wang Yi has held his concurrent post of Tientsin Garrison commander since 1970. Hsu Cheng has responsibilities within the Peking MR as well as on the Tientsin revolutionary committee. The two remaining secretaries, Wang Man-tien and Fei Kuo-chu, have been identified only in civilian positions: Wang holds a vice-chairmanship, and Fei has responsibilities on the revolutionary committee.

Consisting of 65 full and 12 alternate members, the new committee was selected at a gathering of 858 delegates meeting in Tientsin from 22 to 26 May. Hsieh's keynote address to the party congress reflected current PRC propaganda themes. Stressing the need for senior cadres to carry out their study of Mao's works "in close connection with reality," Hsieh called for intensifying criticism of the revisionist "theories peddled by Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, and other political swindlers."

YUNNAN Yunnan appears ready to form its provincial committee. Kunming radio on 31 May claimed sweeping success in rebuilding new party units at the basic and county levels as well as in "a number of special and autonomous districts." Similar claims were broadcast by the radios of several provinces shortly before new committees were announced. Formation of a party committee for Yunnan will reveal who has moved into the power vacuum created by the death of chairman Tan Fu-jen last December. No new chairman has been named.

CONFIDENTIAL